Motivated by the recent experimental evidence on altruistic behavior, we study a simple principal-agent model where each player cares about other players' utility, and may reciprocate their attitude towards him. We show that, relative to the selfish benchmark, efficiency improves when players are altruistic. Nevertheless, in contrast to what may be expected, an increase in the degree of the agent's altruism as well as a more reciprocal behavior by players has ambiguous effects on efficiency. We also consider the effects of the presence of spiteful players and discuss how monetary transfers between players depend on their degrees of altruism and spitefulness.
Introduction
Standard economic theory assumes that agents are sel…sh and only care about their own monetary utility. In practice, however, elements such as fairness, altruism and reciprocity seem to play a crucial role in individual and collective decision making -see, e.g., Becker (1976) , Kahneman et al. (1986) , and Berg et al. (1995) . The experimental evidence amply supports this view. For example, Thaler (1988) …nds that, when playing the ultimatum game, proposers (who should make arbitrarily small o¤ers in theory) typically o¤er equal divisions with the responders, who frequently reject ungenerous o¤ers. Similarly, Dawes and Thaler (1988) …nd that participants in public good contribution games typically make positive contributions, although (in theory) they should not. 1 This suggests that, in real life, individuals are altruistic (i.e., they care about each other's utility) and act reciprocally (i.e., they are good to other good people, and hurt those who hurt them).
Motivated by this evidence, we introduce behavioral elements in a simple principal-agent relationship where the agent is privately informed about his marginal cost of production in order to analyze the e¤ects of altruistic and reciprocal motives in a standard adverse selection model à la Baron and Myerson (1982) . We show that the presence of reciprocal and altruistic motives a¤ects not only the enforcement of incentive contracts (as shown by Fehr et al., 1997) , but also their design and e¢ ciency properties. Speci…cally, we derive the optimal incentive compatible contract and show how the degrees of altruism and reciprocity a¤ect the standard trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and rentextraction. The predictions of the model apply to a wide range of standard contracting environment, such as employer-employee relationships, manufacturer-retailer deals, regulatory policies etc., which are usually analyzed under the hypothesis that the contracting parties are sel…sh.
Following Levine (1998) , we model altruism by introducing a positive weight assigned by a player to his opponents'monetary payo¤, and we model reciprocity by assuming that this weight depends on how altruistic the opponents are. 2 Hence, we distinguish between a player's intrinsic altruistic attitude toward opponents, which is an innate characteristic, and his global attitude, which also depends on the interaction between the opponents'intrinsic attitude and the degree of reciprocity.
If the principal and the agent are globally altruistic the ine¢ ciency due to asymmetric information is lower than with sel…sh players. Moreover, the more altruistic is the principal, the closer the level of production is to the …rst-best outcome. The reason is that the principal's global altruism relaxes the trade-o¤ between rents and e¢ ciency and allows players to exploit production opportunities that, with sel…sh players, were ruled out by asymmetric information. Surprisingly, though, an increase in the agent's global altruism decreases e¢ ciency (i.e., reduces output) because a relatively more altruistic agent is less responsive to monetary incentives, which makes it more costly for the principal 1 See also Kahneman et al. (1986) , Fehr et al. (1997) , and Fehr and List (2004) . 2 By contrast, in Rabin, (1993) , Segal and Sobel (1999) , and Falk and Fishbacher (2006) , a player's degree of altruism depends on his own utility (with respect to a "fair"utility level). In Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) , instead, higherorder beliefs, beliefs of others, and plans of action in ‡uence motivation and behavioral concerns, so as to capture dynamic psychological e¤ects (such as sequential reciprocity, psychological forward induction, and regret).
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to induce an e¢ cient type not to mimic an ine¢ cient one, thus worsening the standard 'distortion at the bottom' result and leading to higher distortions for the quantity produced by ine¢ cient types. Therefore, although altruistic players trade more e¢ ciently than sel…sh ones, more altruistic players do not necessarily trade more e¢ ciently than less altruistic ones (in contrast to what may be expected).
We also determine the impact of changes in players' intrinsic attitude on e¢ ciency. While improvements in the principal's intrinsic altruism always increases e¢ ciency, changes in the agent's intrinsic altruism generates e¢ ciency gains only under speci…c conditions on the degree of reciprocity between players. If the level of reciprocity is high, the principal rewards a more altruistic agent by reducing output distortions. If reciprocity is low, the principal has a weaker incentive to limit distortions to reward the agent, and hence he reduces the output further. Moreover, the e¤ect of increasing reciprocity between players depends on the di¤erence between the agent's and the principal's intrinsic attitudes: if the agent has a more (resp. less) altruistic attitude than the principal, the principal rewards (resp. punishes) him by increasing (resp. decreasing) output and information rents. This non-monotone comparative statics stems from the opposite impact of players' global altruistic attitude on e¢ ciency, and it o¤ers a set of new testable implications on the link between optimal contracting, e¢ ciency and behavioral concerns under asymmetric information.
Players'altruism also has interesting e¤ects on the monetary transfer paid by the principal to the agent. When the agent is su¢ ciently altruistic, the transfer may be negative, so that the agent pays the principal in order to be able to produce. Moreover, contrary to what may be expected, a more altruistic principal may manage to induce the agent to produce a higher quantity (thus increasing total surplus) and, at the same time, obtain a lower transfer. In our model, this "paradox of gift" happens when the agent is su¢ ciently altruistic and ine¢ cient.
Finally, if players are globally spiteful -i.e., they assign a negative weight to their opponent's monetary payo¤ -the ine¢ ciency due to asymmetric information is higher than with sel…sh players because the principal always increases the output distortion to reduce the agent's rent. Contrary to the case of altruistic players, a reduction in the degree of global or intrinsic spitefulness always reduces this ine¢ ciency. The reason is that a less spiteful principal cares less about reducing the agent's rent, while a less spiteful agent cares more about total surplus and less about the transfer. In both cases the incentive problem is relaxed, so that the principal needs to distort output relatively less. As with altruistic players, the e¤ect of increasing reciprocity depends on the di¤erence between the agent's and the principal's intrinsic attitudes.
Our …ndings contribute to the literature on optimal contracting with altruistic and motivated agents. Shchetinin (2009) analyzes optimal contracting in a principal-agent model where the agent is altruistic only if the principal is also altruistic and there is asymmetric information on the degree of altruism. By contrast, we allow both the principal and the agent to be altruistic and we assume that there the asymmetric information concerns the agent's production cost. Siciliani (2009) In moral hazard environments, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2000) , Netzer and Schmutzler (2010) and Immordino and De Marco (2013) show that, when a sel…sh principal interacts with reciprocal agents, e¢ ciency generally increases in symmetric equilibria. Similarly, Dur and Tichen (2012) show that the presence of altruistic players who induce good social relationships in the workplace improves the capacity of relational contracts to induce workers' high e¤ort, while bad social relationships might undermine it. With adverse selection, however, we show that the bene…cial e¤ect of reciprocal and altruistic concerns may be outweighed by the e¤ects of these concerns on information rents, even in a single principal-agent relationship.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. Section 3 develops two benchmarks: one where there is asymmetric information but players are sel…sh, the other where players have altruistic and reciprocal concerns but there is complete information. In Section 4 we characterize the optimal contract with altruistic and reciprocal behavior and perform the relevant comparative statics. Section 5 considers spiteful players. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
Environment. Consider a principal-agent relationship under adverse selection -see, e.g., Baron and Myerson (1982) and La¤ont and Martimort (2002) . A risk-neutral principal (P ) contracts with a risk-neutral agent (A) who produces output q at cost q in exchange for a monetary transfer t.
Production generates a surplus S (q) for the principal, with S 0 ( ) 0, S 0 (0) = +1, lim q!+1 S 0 (q) = 0, and S 00 ( ) < 0.
A is privately informed about (the marginal cost of production), which is distributed on the compact support
[ ; ] according to the (commonly known) continuously di¤erentiable and atomless c.d.f. F ( ), with density F 0 ( ) = f ( ) and increasing inverse hazard rate F ( ) =f ( ).
Players'direct (monetary) utilities from contracting are u P = S (q) t and u A = t q.
Altruism and Reciprocity. Following Levine (1988) , we assume that each player maximizes an adjusted utility, which depends both on his own direct utility, and on the other player's direct utility.
Speci…cally, player i obtains an adjusted utility equal to v i = u i + i u j -i.e., the principal's utility is v P = S (q) t + P (t q) ; and the agent's utility is
where the coe¢ cient
measures player i's global attitude toward player j. In particular, when i > 0, player i has a global altruistic attitude (or is globally altruistic).
The parameter i 0 is an index of player i's intrinsic altruism, while the parameter 0 is the (common) measure of players'reciprocity, or attitude for fairness. For simplicity, we assume that A , P and are common knowledge. (See Remark 1 for a discussion of the additional complexities that emerge when this hypothesis is relaxed.)
When i > 0 we refer to player i as intrinsically altruistic, as such a player has a positive regard for his opponent and his adjusted utility is increasing in player j's direct utility. If i = 0 we refer to the player as sel…sh. We assume that i < 1, so that no player has a higher regard for his opponent than for himself. In Section 5, we also consider intrinsically spiteful players with i < 0.
The parameter 2 [0; 1] re ‡ects the fact that a player may want to reciprocate his opponent's attitude, and hence weighs more the utility of an (intrinsically) altruistic opponent than of a sel…sh one. 3 If = 0 then i = i and there is pure altruism as in Ledyard (1995) . If = 1 then i = j and there is maximal reciprocity.
Contracts and timing. We use the Revelation Principle to characterize the optimal contract. Hence, P o¤ers a direct revelation mechanism M n q(^ ); t(^ ) o^ 2 to A where, given A's report^ , q(^ ) is the output produced by A and t(^ ) is the transfer paid to A. If A rejects the contract, players' utility is normalized to zero.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The agent learns his type.
2. The principal o¤ers a mechanism M.
3. If the agent accepts mechanism M, he makes a report^ , and the output and the transfer are selected according to the mechanism.
Benchmarks
In this section we brie ‡y analyze the two useful benchmarks of sel…sh players and altruistic players with complete information.
Sel…sh players. First, consider the case of sel…sh players -i.e., A = P = = 0. The agent produces the second-best output q SB ( ) that solves the standard Baron-Myerson (1982) rule
where q F B ( ) is the …rst-best output such that S 0 (q F B ( )) = (see, e.g., La¤ont and Martimort, 2002, Ch. 2). The principal chooses an ine¢ ciently low output to minimize the agent's information rent -i.e., the second-best output equalizes the marginal bene…t from production to the virtual marginal cost.
Complete information. Second, assume that players feature altruistic and reciprocal behavior, but that the realization of is common knowledge, so that there is no adverse selection. In this case, the optimal output is equal to the …rst-best level q F B ( ) regardless of A , P , and . Hence, altruism and reciprocity have no e¤ect on e¢ ciency. This neutrality result arises because, with complete information, the principal fully internalizes the e¤ect of altruism and reciprocity through the choice of a transfer that extracts the agent's whole surplus. Hence, …rst-best e¢ ciency is achieved.
Optimal Contract
In contrast to the complete information benchmark, when players have altruistic and reciprocal concerns and the agent is privately informed about his production cost, the information rent paid by the principal to the agent (in order to induce truthful information disclosure) enters with weight di¤erent than 1 into the principal's objective function. This is for two reasons. First, since the principal cares about the agent's utility, reducing the information rent harms the principal. Second, since the agent also cares about the principal's utility, the former is less eager to extract a rent from the latter; hence, the principal may wish to distort more this rent in order to make mimicking less appealing for the agent. These two e¤ects, which stem from the information rent that the agent enjoys thanks to his private information, have an opposite e¤ect on the principal's objective function.
The analysis of the impact of the trade-o¤ between these two e¤ects on the optimal contract is the objective of this section.
In order to characterize the incentive feasible allocations, let
be the agent's utility when his and he reports^ , and let v A ( ) v A ( ; ) be the agent's rent. The principal solves
Condition (1) is A's participation constraint, while (2) is A's incentive compatibility constraint. 4 Using the expression of the agent's utility, the transfer t ( ) as a function of the rent v A ( ) is
(
Substituting (3) into the principal's objective function, standard techniques (see the Appendix) allow to rewrite P 's optimization program as
subject to (1) and
Hence, with altruism, the objective function assigns di¤erent weights to A's rent, v A ( ), and to the total surplus, S (q ( )) q ( ). An increase in the degree of global altruism of the principal P has two e¤ects. First, it reduces the loss su¤ered by the principal for giving up a rent to the agent, because the principal cares more about the agent's utility. Second, it reduces the weight assigned to the total surplus in the principal's objective function decreases, since (1 A P ) is decreasing in P . As we will explain below, this second e¤ect is larger the more altruistic the agent is -i.e., the larger is A .
The next proposition characterizes the optimal contract chosen by the principal.
Proposition 1 In the optimal contract, the output q ( ) > q SB ( ) satis…es the …rst-order necessary and su¢ cient condition
and the optimal transfer is
The optimal contract depends on A , P and . Compared to the case of sel…sh players, e¢ ciency increases with altruistic players since
and hence the distortion in output induced by asymmetric information is lower. The intuition is that, when the principal's adjusted utility assigns a positive weight to the agent's utility, the principal has a lower incentive to reduce the agent's information rent (because the weight assigned to the transfer is lower than in the sel…sh case). This relaxes the standard trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and rent extraction, and hence induces the principal to increase the output produced.
Remark 1. In a model where A and P are not common knowledge, the contracting problem becomes much more complex. The reason is that, in this case, the contract o¤ered by P to A may be contingent on: (i) A's reports about and A ; (ii) P 's claim about P . This requires additional incentive constraints both for the agent (which induces P to solve a multidimensional screening problem) and for the principal, who needs to o¤er menus of contracts that credibly signal his type to the agent, yielding an informed principal problem with common values à la Maskin and Tirole (1992) . 5 We conjecture that, as the dimension of the information asymmetry increases, our qualitative results hold if the cost uncertainty is relatively large compared to the uncertainty about A and P . When this is not the case, new distortions may emerge and create more complex e¤ects of altruism on optimal contracts. Notice however that, when A is common knowledge but P is not, and = 0, our model is a special case of the informed principal problem with private values and risk neutrality analyzed in Maskin and Tirole (1990) . These authors show that, because of quasi-linear utilities, in this case the optimal contract is the one characterized in Proposition 1.
In the next two sections, we discuss the e¤ects of changes in players'altruism and reciprocity on the optimal output and the optimal transfer.
E¤ects of Altruism on E¢ ciency
What is the e¤ect of the strength of players'global altruism on the optimal output? Since the adjusted distortion characterized in Proposition 1 that reduces q ( ) is decreasing in P and increasing in A , we have the following result. 5 Common values arise because, when 6 = 0, A and P a¤ect both players'utilities.
Corollary 1 @q ( ) @ P > 0 and @q ( ) @ A < 0. As P ! 1 output converges to the …rst-best level for any A ; as A ! 1 output converges to the second-best level.
Therefore, an increase in the principal's degree of global altruism increases e¢ ciency, since the principal cares relatively less about reducing the agent's rent and hence increases output. By contrast, e¢ ciency decreases as the agent's degree of global altruism rises. To see this, notice that the marginal e¤ect of an increase in the transfer on the agent's utility is decreasing in A . 6 Hence, when A increases the agent is less responsive to monetary incentives and it is more costly for the principal to induce an e¢ cient agent not to mimic an ine¢ cient one. So an altruistic principal prefers to reduce the output when trading o¤ rent and e¢ ciency. In other words, since (ceteris paribus) a more altruistic agent cares more about total surplus and less about the transfer, to minimize rents the principal assigns a lower weight to total surplus maximization, which in turn induces a higher output distortion.
Both P and A depend on the parameters measuring intrinsic altruism ( A and P ) and reciprocity ( ). The next proposition shows how changes in these parameters a¤ect e¢ ciency. An increase in the principal's intrinsic altruism always increases e¢ ciency, since this reduces the principal's incentive to reduce the agent's rent by distorting output downward. Notice that a higher P increases both P and A , which a¤ect e¢ ciency in opposite ways (as seen in Corollary 1). However, for 2 (0; 1), the e¤ect on P prevails.
By contrast, an increase in the level of reciprocity increases e¢ ciency if and only if the agent is more intrinsically altruistic than the principal. In fact, a higher implies that both players tend to reciprocate more the intrinsic attitude of their opponent, thus acting more like he does. When P > A , an increase in reduces the principal's global altruistic attitude and increases the agent's global altruistic attitude -i.e., @ P @ < 0 and @ A @ > 0 , P > A :
By Corollary 1, both these e¤ects reduce e¢ ciency. By contrast, when the agent is more intrinsically altruistic than the principal, the e¤ects of an increase in are reversed: the principal's global altruistic 6 Notice that @ 2 v A @t@ A = 1.
9 attitude increases while the agent's global altruistic attitude decreases. By Corollary 1, both these e¤ects increase e¢ ciency.
Finally, when the agent's intrinsic altruism rises, e¢ ciency increases if and only if players'reciprocity is su¢ ciently high. To interpret this result, consider the two extreme cases. When = 0, there is no reciprocity and the e¤ect of a change in A is equivalent to the e¤ect of a change in A in Corollary 1. When = 1, there is maximal reciprocity and both players have exactly the same global degree of altruism -i.e., P = A . In this case, the adjusted distortion is equal to F ( ) (1+ A )f ( ) , and an increase in the altruism of any player increases output and e¢ ciency, because it makes both players care less about the monetary transfer, and more about the total surplus created.
Summing up, our analysis suggests that, even though globally altruistic players trade more ef-…ciently than sel…sh ones as expected, an increase in the degree of intrinsic altruism or reciprocity of players does not necessarily yield higher e¢ ciency. This point, which has not been made in the earlier literature on the e¤ects of the presence of altruistic players, should be taken into account in order to properly evaluate the social desirability of public policies that tend to induce agents either to act more altruistically or to reciprocate more the attitude of their opponents.
E¤ects of Altruism on Transfers
How does the optimal monetary transfer t ( ) varies with the players' degrees of global altruism?
It may be expected that, when the degree of global altruism of the principal increases, the principal chooses to pay a higher transfer to the agent. This is not necessarily the case, however. In fact, we show that a "paradox of gift" arises in our model: a more altruistic principal pays a lower transfer to agents that are su¢ ciently altruistic and ine¢ cient, 7 although it induces them to produce more (relatively to less altruistic principals). The next proposition provides su¢ cient conditions for this result.
Proposition 3 If is su¢ ciently close to and
Notice that the left-hand side of condition (6) is increasing in A , and the condition cannot be satis…ed when A = 0. Hence, the transfer paid to ine¢ cient types is more likely to be decreasing in P when the agent is su¢ ciently altruistic. Intuitively, two e¤ects in ‡uence the responsiveness of the optimal transfer to the principal's global altruism. On the one hand, by Corollary 1, the optimal output increases as P increases, which tends to raise t ( ). On the other hand, a higher 7 Clearly for agent's types close to the most e¢ cient one, the optimal transfer is increasing in P . 10 output increases total surplus and, ceteris paribus, this reduces t ( ), since an altruistic agent cares relatively more about total surplus than the transfer. This second e¤ect dominates when A is large.
Notice also that the left-hand side of condition (6) is decreasing in P , and the condition cannot be satis…ed when P = 1: the paradox of gift arises only when the principal is not too altruistic.
The reason is that, when P ! 1, the output tends to the …rst-best level, so that the second e¤ect discussed above is negligible.
So far, we have only provided su¢ cient conditions under which the optimal transfer may decrease with P . In order to fully characterize the comparative statics of t ( ) with respect to players' altruism (including A ), 8 we now consider the uniform-quadratic case -i.e., we assume that S(q) = aq 1 2 q 2 , with a > 2, and
Lemma 1 In the uniform-quadratic case, the optimal transfer t ( ) is decreasing in A . Moreover, there are two unique thresholds A < 1 and A < 1 such that the optimal transfer t ( ) is:
This result con…rms the intuitions stated above: the dominant e¤ect of a higher P on t ( ) depends on the degree of A's global altruism and on his marginal cost. Moreover, an agent with a very high degree of global altruism may compensate the principal for being part of the relationship.
Finally, increasing A's degree of global altruism has contrasting e¤ects on the optimal transfer.
First, by Corollary 1 a more altruistic agent induces P to reduces q ( ), and this tends to decrease t ( ). Second, ceteris paribus, a higher A increases the weight attached by A to the total surplus relative to the transfer. This direct e¤ect tends to reduce t ( ). Third, a lower optimal quantity reduces the total surplus, and this requires a higher t ( ) to compensate the agent. Under our assumptions, the …rst two e¤ects prevail so that t ( ) is decreasing in A .
Spitefulness
In this section, we extend the analysis to the case where both players are intrinsically spiteful -i.e., i < 0, i = A; P -and, hence, have a global spiteful attitude -i.e., i < 0, i = A; P . In this case, each player has a negative regard for his opponent and his adjusted utility is decreasing in the other player's direct utility. A reduction in i implies an increase in the degree of spitefulness of player i.
We assume that j i j < 1, so that no player has a higher regard for his opponents than for himself.
E¤ects of Spitefulness on E¢ ciency
With spiteful players, the optimal contract is the same as the one characterized in Proposition 1. In contrast to the case of altruistic players, however, the presence of a globally spiteful principal always reduces e¢ ciency compared to the case of sel…sh players since, when P < 0,
and hence q ( ) < q SB ( ). This holds regardless of whether the agent is globally spiteful or not. In fact, when the principal's adjusted utility assigns a negative weight to the agent's direct utility, the principal always increases the output distortion to reduce the agent's information rent.
Since with spiteful players the adjusted distortion due to asymmetric information characterized in Proposition 1 is decreasing in both P and A (because i < 0, i = A; P ), we have the following result.
Corollary 2 When i < 0, i = A; P : @q ( ) @ P > 0 and @q ( )
Hence, decreasing either the principal's or the agent's degree of global spitefulness increases e¢ ciency. On the one hand, when P increases the principal cares less about reducing the agent's rent and hence increases output. On the other hand, when A increases, the agent cares more about total surplus and less about the transfer, so that the incentive problem is relaxed and the principal can distort output relatively less.
The next proposition shows how the parameters measuring intrinsic altruism ( A and P ) and reciprocity ( ) a¤ect e¢ ciency when players are intrinsically spiteful.
Proposition 4 When i < 0, i = A; P , the optimal output q ( ) is increasing in P and A . Moreover, there are two unique thresholds 2 (0; 1) and A 2 ( 1; 0) such that the optimal output q ( ) is:
When the principal becomes less intrinsically spiteful, e¢ ciency increases, since this reduces the principal's incentive to reduce the agent's rent by distorting output downward. This is because a higher P increases both P and A and, by Corollary 2, these e¤ects unambiguously increase e¢ ciency. In contrast to the case of altruistic players, however, increasing A also increases output and e¢ ciency, since a higher A increases both P and A .
The e¤ects of a higher degree of reciprocity on e¢ ciency are more interesting. If the agent is intrinsically more spiteful than the principal -i.e., P > A -an increase in the degree of reciprocity decreases e¢ ciency. By the analysis of Section 4, when P > A a higher increases P 's global spitefulness ( @ P @ < 0) but decreases A's global spitefulness ( @ A @ > 0) and, by Corollary 2, these two changes have opposite e¤ects on e¢ ciency. On balance, the e¤ect on P 's global attitude is stronger and optimal output decreases if reciprocity increases: the principal's interest in decreasing the agent's rent prevails over the agent's reduced interest in the transfer.
By contrast, when the principal is intrinsically more spiteful than the agent -i.e., P < Athe e¤ect on e¢ ciency of a change in depends on the degree of the agent's intrinsic spitefulness.
First, if A is relatively low, output and e¢ ciency increase with . To see why, recall that @ P @ > 0
and @ A @ < 0 when P < A , but the e¤ect on the principal's global attitude dominates when A is relatively low. Second, if A is relatively high, there is a large di¤erence in players' degrees of spitefulness and e¢ ciency increases with if and only if reciprocity is su¢ ciently high. To see why, consider the two extreme cases. When is small, the e¤ect on the agent's global attitude prevails:
the output distortion increases because inducing truthtelling is more costly for the principal. When is high, the e¤ect on the principal's global attitude prevails: the output distortion decreases because the principal is less interested in reducing the agent's rent.
Summing up, considering players'intrinsic spitefulness provides new interesting results. First, the presence of a globally spiteful principal creates more allocative distortions compared to the secondbest outcome with sel…sh players, while the agent's global attitude has no e¤ect. Second, although changes in the degree of intrinsic spitefulness go in the expected direction, a change in reciprocity has non-trivial e¤ects on e¢ ciency and output.
E¤ects of Spitefulness on Transfers
How does the optimal transfer t ( ) vary with spitefulness? As in Section 4.2, to analyze this issue we consider the uniform-quadratic case and assume that S(q) = aq 1 2 q 2 , with a > 2, and U [0; 1].
Lemma 2
In the uniform-quadratic case, when i < 0, i = A; P , the optimal transfer t ( ) is: always positive; increasing in P ;
decreasing in A if either P or A are large enough;
increasing in A if both P and A are not too large.
Hence, with globally spiteful players, the principal always pays to the agent a positive transfer.
Moreover, when P 's global spitefulness decreases -i.e., P increases -the two e¤ects of Lemma 1 go in the same direction, and the optimal transfer increases with P . This is because, by Corollary 2, a less spiteful principal increases q ( ) and this increases rents and total production costs, which 13 tends to increase t ( ). Furthermore, a higher q ( ) increases total surplus, and this also tends to increase t ( ).
Finally, when A's global spitefulness decreases -i.e., A increases -there are three contrasting e¤ects. First, by Corollary 2, a less spiteful agent induces P to increase q ( ), which increases rents and total costs and, hence, t ( ). Second, a higher q ( ) rises total surplus and this tends to increase t ( ). Third, a less spiteful agent attaches, ceteris paribus, a higher weight to total surplus relative to the transfer, and this tends to decrease t ( ). If either the principal or the agent are relatively sel…sh, the last e¤ect dominates and the transfer decreases in A . By contrast, when both players are relatively spiteful, the …rst two e¤ects prevail and the transfer increases in A .
Remark 2. When one of the players is altruistic while the other is spiteful, the qualitative insights of our results remain the same. Noteworthy, the comparative statics of the optimal transfer with respect to A and P depends on whether the principal or the agent is the altruistic player. Speci…cally, it
can be shown that, if P > 0 and A < 0, the optimal transfer is increasing in P and decreasing in A . By contrast, when P < 0 and A > 0, again there is a sort of paradox of gift when the principal becomes less spiteful, while comparative statics with respect to A has the same qualitative features as those in Lemma 2.
Conclusions
This paper contributes to the behavioral contracting literature by analyzing the e¤ects of altruism and reciprocity on the design of optimal contracts in a simple principal-agent relationship with adverse selection. We have considered the e¤ects both of the intrinsic attitude of players towards opponents, which is an innate characteristic, and of their global attitude, which also takes into account their willingness to reciprocate the opponents'behavior. Although global altruistic behavior allows to sustain more e¢ cient outcomes than with sel…sh players, the (marginal) e¤ect of an increase in players' intrinsic altruistic and reciprocal attitudes has ambiguous e¤ects on e¢ ciency. In particular, we have shown that a more reciprocal behavior improves e¢ ciency if and only if the agent is intrinsically more altruistic than the principal. Similarly, dealing with an intrinsically more altruistic agent does not necessarily improves e¢ ciency, and it actually leads to a higher distortion when both players feature a low reciprocal attitude.
By contrast, the presence of a globally spiteful principal always reduces e¢ ciency compared to the case of sel…sh players, regardless of whether the agent is globally spiteful or not. In fact, when the principal assigns a negative weight to the agent's direct utility, the principal always increases the output distortion to reduce the agent's rent. As expected, e¢ ciency increases when the players become less spiteful. By contrast, changes in the degree of reciprocity generates e¢ ciency gains only under speci…c conditions on the agent's degree of intrinsic spitefulness.
The comparative statics on the optimal transfer also o¤ers an interesting result. Contrary to @v A ( ;^ )
which yield the envelope condition
Using the de…nition of v A ( ) to solve for t ( ) -i.e., equation (3) 
Integrating (A3) yields the standard expression for the agent's rent
To solve P 's program, we …rst ignore (A2) and then check that it is satis…ed in the solution obtained. Hence, substituting (A5) into (A4) and integrating by parts, P 's (relaxed) optimization program is
Since this objective function is strictly concave under our assumptions, the …rst-order condition (4) that de…nes q ( ) is also su¢ cient for an internal optimum. Moreover, by the implicit function theorem,
This is negative since S 00 ( ) < 0 and F ( ) f ( ) is increasing in -i.e., q ( ) satis…es (A2). Finally, to check that the global incentive compatibility constraint is satis…ed, notice that
Using the …rst-order incentive compatibility constraint (A1), this yields
which is satis…ed since A < 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let the adjusted distortion be
The output q ( ) is decreasing in for every , since S ( ) is concave and i 2 (0; 1), i = A; P . First, consider the e¤ect of a change in P on . Di¤erentiating and rearranging terms yields
This inequality is always satis…ed. Therefore, @q ( ) @ P > 0. Second, consider the e¤ect of a change in on . Di¤erentiating and rearranging terms yields
> 0:
(A8) Hence, @q ( ) @ > 0 , A > P . Finally, consider the e¤ect of a change in A on . Di¤erentiating and rearranging terms yields
The left-hand-side of this inequality is a strictly concave function of , it is strictly positive if ! 1 (when either A 6 = 0 or P 6 = 0), and it is strictly negative when ! 0. Hence, there exists a unique threshold 2 (0; 1) such that @q ( ) @ A < 0 if < , and @q ( )
Proof of Proposition 3. Using a …rst-order Taylor approximation of t ( ) around ! , the optimal transfer can be rewritten as
where _ t = A S 0 q . Hence, for close enough to ,
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to P and using the …rst-order condition (4), when ! we have @t ( )
Since @q ( ) @ P > 0 by Corollary 1, it follows that in a neighborhood of
Rearranging yields the result.
Proof of Lemma 1. In the uniform-quadratic case, the optimal quantity is
where q F B ( ) = a . Hence, using equation (5) the optimal transfer is
First, notice that the sign of t ( ) is equal to the sign of a 2 2 P A + 2 (4 P ) 2a( P + a) + P P 2
A + + 2 P + 2 + 4a 3 P + a 2 4 2 A + ( 2 + 1)(2 P ) 2a;
which, for A 2 (0; 1), is a strictly concave function of A , is positive for A ! 0, and is negative for A ! 1. Hence, there exists a unique threshold A 2 (0; 1) such that t ( ) > 0 if A < A and t ( ) < 0 otherwise. Next, di¤erentiating t ( ) with respect to P yields @t ( ) @ P > 0 , @q ( ) @ P + Z 1 @q (x) @ P dx A S 0 (q ( )) @q ( ) @ P > 0 such that @t ( ) @ P > 0 when A < A , and @t ( )
Finally, di¤erentiating t ( ) with respect to A yields
It can be shown that the sign of @t ( ) @ A is equal to the sign of (a 1) 2 P + 2 2 (1 P ) P A + 1 3 2 2 P P 2 A + + 3a (2 a) + 7 2 4 P 4 2
P 2
A + a(2 a) + 2( 2 1)+ + 2 ( P + 2) 2 P + 3 a (a 2) 2 + 5 P A + (2 P 5) 2 2 P ;
which is strictly increasing in A and negative when A ! 1. Hence, @t ( )
Proof of Proposition 4. First, consider the e¤ect of changes in P and A on the adjusted distortion 
When A < P , condition (A13) is never satis…ed (since P < 0 and A < 0) and, hence, @q ( ) @ < 0. When, A > P , condition (A13) yields @ @ < 0 ,
The left-hand side of inequality (A14) is a strictly concave function of (for > 0) and is strictly negative when ! 1. Letting A 1 + P 2 P , there are two possible cases:
1. If A < A , the left-hand side of (A14) is strictly negative for any 2 (0; 1). Hence, @q ( ) @ > 0.
2. If A > A , the left-hand side of (A14) is strictly positive when ! 0. Hence, in this case, there exists a unique threshold b 2 (0; 1) such that @q ( ) @ < 0 if < b , and @q ( ) @ > 0 otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, Proposition 1 implies that t ( ) > 0 when i < 0, i = A; P . Second, @t ( ) @ P (which is derived in the proof of Lemma 1) is positive when i < 0, i = A; P . Notice that these two results holds for any speci…cation of S(q) and any distribution of .
Finally, the sign of @t ( ) @ A (which is derived in the proof of Lemma 1) is equal to the sign of (A12), which is a strictly decreasing function of A and is negative when A ! 0. Moreover, letting P 1 + p 2 2 (2(a ) 2 +1)+1 (1+ 2 ) a(a 2) 2 ( 1; 0) ; we have that:
If P > P , (A12) is negative when A ! 1. Hence, in this case, @t ( ) @ A < 0.
If P < P , (A12) is positive when A ! 1. Hence, there exists a unique threshold A 2 ( 1; 0) such that @t ( ) @ A > 0 if A < A and @t ( )
